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We live in what has been aptly termed ‘the century of the child’. Nev-
er before have the obligations of society to its more helpless members 
been so generally recognized; and of all forms of helplessness that of 
childhood makes the strongest and most universal appeal.1 
Life without parole sends the message, “You are not worthy of reha-
bilitation. You’re worthless. You’re a monster. You’re not fit for 
society. And you’re a dangerous, rabid animal that needs to be kept 
away.”2  
I. INTRODUCTION 
On an evening in early May 2006, while on a walk with his cousin 
through their north Minneapolis neighborhood, Christopher Lynch 
was shot multiple times.3  He was rushed to the hospital, but later died 
from his injuries.4  Six minutes after Lynch was pronounced dead, the 
 
 1. Edward F. Waite, New Laws for Minnesota Children, 1 MINN. L. REV. 48, 48 
(1917).  Waite emphasized that the revision of Minnesota child welfare laws was of 
great importance.  Id. at 49.  
 2. Frontline: When Kids Get Life (PBS television broadcast May 8, 2007).  Quote of 
Jacob Ind.  He was fifteen at the time of his crime, and twenty-nine when the program 
aired.  Id. 
 3. Brief of Appellant at 6–7, State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89 (Minn. 2009) (No. 
A07-1262) (citing Transcript of Record at 1485, Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89 (No. A07-
1262) [hereinafter Transcript]).  Notably,   
[t]he trial transcript was provided to appellant in consecutively paginated volumes I 
through XXI.  However, Vol. VI ends on page 959 and Vol. VII begins on page 959.  
Similarly, Vol. VIII begins on page 959 and duplicates the numbering for Vol. VII.  
Appellant informed the court reporter of this problem but no correction was offered 
or performed.  It was later discovered that the court reporter misrepresented having 
transcribed and delivered the January 16, 2007 transcript.  This transcript was 
subsequently requested by the parties and transcribed in a separate volume with 
separate pagination. 
Id. at 6 (emphasis added).  The court did not address or mention this issue in the 
Martin opinion.  
 4. Id. at 8 (citing Transcript, supra note 3, at 2072–73). 
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2010] STATE v. MARTIN 1273 
police arrived at the crime scene and began their investigation.5  This 
sequence of events occurred against a backdrop of sporadic yet 
violent conflicts between rival gangs, the Tre Tre Crips and the 19 
Block Dipset (19s), who controlled different territories in and around 
north Minneapolis.6  Christopher’s cousin, Jermaine Mack-Lynch, 
testified that violence would occur when members from these groups 
encountered one another.7   
Lamonte Martin, the young man subsequently arrested and in-
dicted for first-degree murder and commission of a crime for benefit 
of a gang,8 did not turn eighteen until June 27, 2006—some eight 
weeks after the shooting.9  Yet in late January 2007, he was automati-
cally certified to stand trial as an adult, pursuant to Minnesota 
statutes.10  Less than two months later, on March 6, 2007, a Hennepin 
County jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts.11  The district 
court entered judgment of conviction of first-degree premeditated 
murder against Martin, which triggered another statutory provision: a 
sentence of life without release (LWOR).12  The certification and 
sentence were not considered in light of the individual characteristics 
of Martin’s circumstance.13  The statutory apparatus in place prec-
 
 5. Lynch was pronounced dead at the hospital at 7:14 p.m.  Id. (citing 
Transcript, supra note 3, at 2087).  The police arrived at 7:20 p.m.  Id. (citing 
Transcript, supra note 3, at 1427). 
 6. Id. at 6 (citing Transcript, supra note 3, at 1537).  “[T]he use of the term 
‘gangs’ should not be interpreted as appellant’s conceding that the state proved 
existence of any gangs under the statutory definition.”  Id. at n.1.  
 7. Brief of Appellant at 6, Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89 (No. A07-1262) (citing 
Transcript, supra note 3, at 1484).  The rivalry may have commenced after Jermaine, a 
Tre Tre member, and one of the 19s got into a dispute over a girl, and Jermaine shot 
the 19 in the neck.  Id. (citing Transcript, supra note 3, at 1602). 
 8. See MINN. STAT. §§ 609.185(a)(1), 609.229, subdiv. 2 (2008). 
 9. Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 99 n.5.  Christopher Lynch was shot and killed May 3, 
2006.  Id. 
 10. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.101 (2008) (giving juvenile court original jurisdiction 
over “delinquent” children), and MINN. STAT. § 260B.007, subdiv. 6(b) (2008) (“The 
term delinquent child does not include a child alleged to have committed murder in 
the first degree after becoming 16 years of age . . . .”).  Because he was accused of 
murder in the first degree, Martin could not be classified, under statute, as a 
delinquent child, and thus could not be subject to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.  
Instead, he was within the district court’s jurisdiction, as an adult offender would be. 
 11. Brief of Appellant at 2, Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89 (No. A07-1262). 
 12. See MINN. STAT. § 609.185, subdiv. a(1) (2008) (life imprisonment for 
committing murder in the first degree when premeditated); MINN. STAT. § 609.106, 
subdiv. 2 (2008) (life without parole for committing premeditated murder in the first 
degree). 
 13. According to [Martin’s] school records,  
“[H]e had severe deficits in reading, writing skills, cognitive ability and attention 
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luded any kind of individualized or evaluative process.14   
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently indicated that this statu-
tory scheme, and its culmination in the imposition of LWOR on a 
juvenile, is neither cruel nor unusual as contemplated by the Eighth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution of the 
State of Minnesota.15  The court concluded that no aspect of Martin’s 
case took it beyond the bounds of federal and state constitutionality.16  
On October 8, 2009, it affirmed Martin’s conviction and his sentence 
of life without release.17  He is twenty-one years old. 
This note will first examine the foundation of juvenile justice, 
including its history, the philosophy behind the early juvenile courts, 
and several key judicial and legislative trends that have shaped 
juvenile justice jurisprudence in this century and last.18  The note then 
discusses the Martin decision in detail19 and, in a subsequent analysis,20 
posits that both the majority opinion and the dissent missed a 
genuine opportunity to, at the very least, call attention to a statutory 
scheme that effectively eliminates any chance for individualized 
consideration of the factors of cases like Martin’s.21  This note then 
suggests that, depending on the outcome of two cases pending at the 
U.S. Supreme Court, Martin’s sentence of life without release may be 
abrogated anyway.22  While acknowledging the difficulty of constitu-
 
span.  At age fourteen, he was functioning intellectually in the borderline range and 
at the sixth percentile.  He qualified for special education services . . . .”  The trial 
court . . . was precluded from . . . considering . . . [these] records. 
Brief of Appellant at 17, Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89 (No. A07-1262). 
 14. Id. at 16; MINN. STAT. § 260B.007, subdiv. 6(b) (2008).  
 15. Compare MINN. CONST. art. I, § 5, which provides that no “cruel or unusual 
punishments [be] inflicted” (use of “or” signaling disjunctive), with U.S. CONST. 
amend. VIII, which prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments” (use of “and” 
signaling conjunctive).   Minnesota’s Constitution affords its citizens greater 
protections than its federal counterpart.  See also Brief of Appellant at 22, Martin, 773 
N.W.2d 89 (No. A07-1262) (“The state constitution provides more protection because 
the disjunctive ‘or’ allows a court to prohibit a punishment if the punishment is 
either cruel or unusual.” (citing State v. Mitchell, 577 N.W.2d 481, 488 (Minn. 
1998))). 
 16. Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 99. 
 17. Id. at 89; Maricella Miranda, Minnesota Supreme Court: Life Without Parole 
Upheld for Juvenile: Justices Say ‘Cruel and Unusual’ Description Doesn’t Fit Case, ST. PAUL 
PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Oct. 9, 2009, at B8; Rochelle Olson, Juvenile’s Life Term is 
Legal, Court Says: State Supreme Court Says Life in Prison for 17-Year-Old is Neither Cruel Nor 
Unusual, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 9, 2009, at Local/Metro. 
 18. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. See infra Part IV. 
 21. See infra Part IV.B. 
 22. See infra Part IV.C. 
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2010] STATE v. MARTIN 1275 
tional line-drawing, this note goes on to review and suggest some 
possible approaches that courts, legislatures, and other institutions 
could take to begin to address the issue of LWOR sentencing for 
juveniles in a more thoughtful and proportionate way, and how the 
Minnesota Supreme Court had a perfect forum in Martin in which to 
call attention to these measures.23  The note concludes by explaining 
that by passively endorsing a cruel and misguided statutory scheme, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court may have effectively undermined this 
state’s commitment to forward-thinking juvenile justice.24  
II. HISTORY 
A. The Juvenile Justice System 
Julian Mack, a noted judge in the formative years of the juvenile 
justice system, explained his professional approach: 
The problem for determination by the judge is not, Has this 
boy or girl committed a specific wrong, but What is he, how 
has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his 
interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a 
downward career.25  
1. Creation of the Juvenile Court 
Americans have historically viewed juvenile delinquents as less 
culpable than adult offenders.26  As the nineteenth century drew to a 
close, Progressive thinkers began to conceptualize childhood as a 
crucial period of development and growth, as opposed to the 
competing notion that children were “small adults.”27  Accompanying 
this notion was a more scientific understanding of social control—
 
 23. See infra Part VI.D. 
 24. See infra Part V. 
 25. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119–20 (1909). 
 26. See generally Barry C. Feld, A Century of Juvenile Justice: A Work in Progress or a 
Revolution That Failed?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 189 (2007) (analyzing changes in juvenile 
justice policies over the past century); ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE 
INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 137–63 (1977) (explaining the history of, and the 
philosophy behind, the development of the juvenile court). 
 27. Feld, supra note 26, at 189.  See also David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of 
Juvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth Century: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, 
in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 42, 46 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002) 
(“The inventors of the juvenile court considered themselves part of a humanitarian 
movement which, in the nineteenth century, had transformed the status of children 
from the sole property of their fathers into a dependent class in need of state 
protection.”). 
5
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what Feld referred to as positive criminology28—that inspired 
reformers to attempt to identify the causes of crime and to move from 
punishment to a more holistic style of treatment of offenders.29   
Similarly, juvenile courts were created to address the differences 
between adults and children.  The focus of the juvenile justice system 
was rehabilitation, not punishment.  To this end, juvenile court judges 
could consider developmental, social, and psychological factors of 
every individual child who came before them.   
Such judicial discretion was particularly important in an era when 
immigrants were coming to America and into its courtrooms from all 
over the world.  Indeed, from their inception, juvenile courts 
identified as a cognizable goal the socialization and “Ameri-
canization” of the children of immigrants pouring into the rapidly-
expanding industrial centers of the East and Midwest.30  The examina-
tion of each child’s situation allowed juvenile courts to design an 
individualized, constructive response to the child’s delinquency issues, 
rather than lumping all child offenders together and disciplining 
them as though no differences existed among them.31  The focus of 
the juvenile justice system was on rehabilitation, not on punishment.32  
Another difference between the new juvenile courts and their adult 
 
 28. Feld, supra note 26, at 189.    
 29. Id. (“Jurisdiction over dependent as well as delinquent children reflected 
juvenile courts’ broader role as a child-saving welfare agency and not simply a ‘junior’ 
criminal court.”).  See also Lisa McNaughton, Extending Roper’s Reasoning to Minnesota’s 
Juvenile Justice System, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1063 (2006) (asserting that the long-
term interests of public safety, fairness, and the sensible administration of justice can 
all be appeased while addressing the brain development realities of juveniles, 
concepts of deterrence, and the goals of juvenile justice).  See also DAVID S. 
TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING 4 (2004) (emphasizing that formative 
juvenile court legislation “asserted state responsibility for both dependent and 
delinquent children and thus merged concerns about child welfare with crime 
control”). 
 30. Feld, supra note 26, at 189. 
 31. See, e.g., TANENHAUS, supra note 29, at 4 (emphasizing that juvenile court 
legislation “asserted state responsibility for both dependent and delinquent children 
and thus merged concerns about child welfare with crime control.”); see also MINN. 
STAT. § 260B.001, subdiv. 2 (2008) (“The purpose of the laws relating to children 
alleged or adjudicated to be delinquent is to promote the public safety and reduce 
juvenile delinquency by maintaining the integrity of the substantive law prohibiting 
certain behavior and by developing individual responsibility for lawful behavior.”).   
 32. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1967) (noting that the idealistic reformers 
who developed the juvenile system embraced the notion that “[t]he child was to be 
‘treated’ and ‘rehabilitated’ and the procedures, from apprehension through 
institutionalization, were to be ‘clinical’ rather than punitive”); Feld, supra note 26, at 
189; Mack, supra note 25, at 107; McNaughton, supra note 29, at 1063–64; supra notes 
26–29 and accompanying text. 
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counterparts was the procedural informality.  In the juvenile courts, 
there were no trials by juries, trials were not public, and there were no 
constitutionally-guaranteed rights for the juveniles accused in these 
courts.33  
2. Juvenile Courts: Rehabilitative in Theory, Punitive in  Practice 
By the mid-1960s, the realities of heavy caseloads and budget 
shortfalls undermined the noble aims of these juvenile courts.34  
McNaughton has described most juvenile treatment facilities at that 
time as “factory-like.”35  Likely because of the strain on this relatively 
new niche of young offender treatment, ideological underpinnings 
had given way to cut corners and an ever-decreasing availability of 
follow-up treatment to prevent recidivism.36  Additionally, few 
procedural safeguards were in place to assure that the consequences 
were imposed only after guilt was clearly established.37  Put quite 
simply, “purely punitive solutions were easier to apply.”38 
3. The U.S. Supreme Court Steps In—Due Process for Juveniles 
Many of these jurisdictions were under-staffed and under-funded, 
so it is not surprising that due process was significantly compro-
mised—if indeed it ever existed—in this nascent juvenile system.  
 
 33. See generally Wright S. Walling & Stacia Walling Driver, 100 Years of Juvenile 
Court in Minnesota—A Historical Overview and Perspective, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 883 
(2006) (discussing the historical developments which led to the current procedures 
and status of juvenile courts in Minnesota, and asserting that the issues addressed by 
the juvenile court are some of the most important dealt with by any court system, thus 
an influx of commitment, time, money, and expertise is necessary).   
The fact that the juvenile court exercised the power to take children from their 
parents and to commit children to state training schools by procedures that did not 
involve a jury or a public trial, the right to remain silent, the right to counsel and the 
rest, raised serious questions of constitutional law. The power of the juvenile court to 
operate in this informal fashion was almost universally sustained in state courts by 
characterizing the proceedings as civil rather than criminal. 
Id. at 893–94; see also Mason P. Thomas Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect Part I: Historical 
Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REV. 293, 300 (1972) (noting 
that throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, courts rarely intervened 
against harsh discipline).  But see JOHN DEMOS, PAST, PRESENT AND PERSONAL: THE 
FAMILY AND THE LIFE COURSE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 29 (1986) (discussing the 
attentiveness of officials and their eagerness to intervene when a parent’s or parents’ 
conduct endangered their children). 
 34. McNaughton, supra note 29, at 1064. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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Predictably, the dramatically different results yielded by juvenile 
courts nationwide caught the attention of the U.S. Supreme Court.  
During the 1960s, the Court took several opportunities to explicitly 
declare that juveniles were entitled to some of the same due process 
procedural safeguards as adults.  In 1966, the Supreme Court decided 
Kent v. United States.39  That case came before the Court after sixteen-
year-old Morris Kent, on probation for earlier offenses, was charged 
with eight counts, including house-breaking, robbery, and rape.40  
Under a District of Columbia statute, the trial judge was not required 
to hold a hearing, make findings, nor give any reason whatsoever for 
waiving the juvenile from juvenile court jurisdiction to adult court 
jurisdiction and to adult court sentencing.41  When Kent’s new 
allegations came before the trial court judge, he waived jurisdiction in 
juvenile court.  This decision to waive the case was based almost 
exclusively on his personal estimation of Morris Kent’s “amenability 
to treatment under the facilities” of the juvenile court.42  That 
amenability, apparently, was nil.  Kent was tried in adult court.43  A 
jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity for the rape charge, 
but guilty on six counts of housebreaking.44  
The U.S. Supreme Court vacated Kent’s conviction45 because of 
the arbitrariness46 and noted lack of due process in Kent’s transfer to 
adult court out of juvenile court.47  Wright S. Walling and Stacia 
Walling Driver observed that the Kent case was crucial because it put 
to rest the issue of whether or not due process had a place in the 
juvenile justice system: 
In the first case of its kind involving a child, the Supreme 
Court in Kent established a standard of due process, taken 
 
 39. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
 40. Id. at 543, 548. 
 41. Id. at 546–48. 
 42. MONRAD G. PAULSEN & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD, JUVENILE LAW AND 
PROCEDURE 13 (N. Corinne Smith ed., 1974), noted in Walling & Driver, supra note 33, 
at 903–04. 
 43. Kent, 383 U.S. at 550.  One wonders how it could have been “a jury of his 
peers,” though there is no constitutional requirement that it had to be.  See U.S. 
CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed . . . .”). 
 44. Kent, 383 U.S. at 550. 
 45. Id. at 564–65 (vacating conditionally for a hearing de novo on waiver at the 
district court.)  Kent’s conviction would only be vacated with a district court finding 
that waiver was improper.  Id. 
 46. Id. at 561. 
 47. Id. at 564–65. 
8
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from the Fourteenth Amendment, and applied it to juvenile 
proceedings.  As history has shown, and perhaps not surpri-
singly given the fact that juvenile courts are and were by that 
point agencies of the government, some juvenile court 
judges continued to argue that due process had no place 
whatsoever in a court for children.  Kent settled the point 
and Mr. Justice Fortas speaking for the Supreme Court 
stated, “[W]e . . . hold that the hearing must measure up to 
the essentials of due process and fair treatment.”48   
In 1967, the Court decided In re Gault.49  In that case out of Ari-
zona, the Court concluded that committing the fifteen-year-old 
defendant was a clear violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.50  
Neither the juvenile, Gerald Gault, nor his mother, had been given 
adequate notice of the charges against Gerald—allegations that he’d 
made obscene phone calls to a neighbor.51  Gault was adjudicated 
delinquent after he made an admission at the juvenile court hearing, 
where he was not advised of rights that the Supreme Court would 
later find he was entitled to, such as a right against self-incrimination 
and the right to counsel.52  The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed on 
appeal.53   
The U.S. Supreme Court held that, in addition to having a right 
to a notice of charges,54 the juvenile had a right to counsel,55 to 
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses,56 and the privilege 
against self-incrimination.57  None of these had been afforded to 
juveniles prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kent.58  
The Court’s opinion in In re Winship59 declared that the reasona-
ble-doubt standard of criminal law is constitutional in nature and that 
 
 48. Walling & Driver, supra note 33, at 904 (footnotes omitted). 
 49. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).   
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 4–5. 
 52. Id. at 42. 
 53. Id. at 9–10. 
 54. Id. at 33. 
 55. Id. at 41. 
 56. Id. at 42. 
 57. Id. at 55. 
 58. See PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 42, at 12, noted in Walling & Driver, 
supra note 33, at 903 (“For almost seventy years ‘young persons were adjudicated 
delinquent, dependent, and neglected [during] informal proceedings less protective 
of [their] individual rights than those available to an adult criminal.’  [T]he Supreme 
Court reviewed the first of several juvenile court cases on the issue of due process in 
Kent v. United States.”). 
 59. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
9
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juveniles are entitled to proof beyond that standard when charged 
with violation of a criminal law.60   
 These due process reforms to the juvenile justice system ap-
peared to increase constitutional protections for youth, but they have 
not escaped criticism in the forty years since their implementation.61  
The explicit granting of rights in and of itself is not problematic, but 
the juvenile courts to which these rights were applied became, as a 
result, more formalistic and adversarial in nature.62  Consequently, 
critics have drawn parallels between the adult system and what the 
juvenile system transformed into because of these reforms.63  
Moreover, the judicial apparatus designed to serve the youth ap-
peared to continue to drift from its moorings of rehabilitative theory, 
and state legislatures certainly facilitated that drift.64  State legislators, 
seeking votes, pledged to “get tough” on crime if elected.  The rate at 
which juveniles committed violent crimes—rapes, robberies, and 
aggravated assaults—remained relatively stable between 1973 and 
1989, but it increased by almost 43% between 1989 and 1993.65  And 
despite a modest decline in the juvenile murder arrest rate between 
1993 and 1995, the 1995 rate was double that of 1985.66 “Many of 
these offenders were friends and acquaintances of their victims.”67   
Scary and staggering statistics like this provided politicians with 
fuel for the “get tough on crime” fire they were fanning.  Additional-
ly, the media sensationalized some highly disturbing cases—making 
the most heinous exceptions seem like the rule of juvenile criminal 
behavior.68  During a particularly drastic spike in violent juvenile 
 
 60. Id. at 368. 
 61. McNaughton, supra note 29, at 1065.   
 62. Id. 
 63. See BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE 
COURT 287 (1999).  Feld argues that the due process reforms ended up transforming 
the juvenile system into a “scaled-down, second-class criminal court for young 
people.”  Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. HOWARD N. SNYDER ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY 
PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1997 UPDATE ON 
VIOLENCE 16 (1997). 
 66. Id. at 20. 
 67. NAT’L CRIM. JUSTICE ASS’N, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM 
INITIATIVES IN THE STATES: 1994-1996, at ii (1997) [hereinafter OJJDP REPORT], 
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/reform.pdf. 
 68. See, e.g., Timothy Egan, Where Rampages Begin: A special report. From Adolescent 
Angst to Shooting Up Schools, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1998, at 11 (“In looking at the 221 
deaths at American schoolyards over the last six years, what leaps out is how the 
shootings changed dramatically in the last two years—not the number, but the 
type.”); Ashbel S. Green & Janet Filips, The Suspect: Kipland Kinkel’s Dark Side Was No 
10
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crime between 1987 and 1991, legislatures trotted out a more 
punitive—and less discerning—approach to deal with child offend-
ers.69 
B. Juvenile Justice in Minnesota 
1. The Task Force 
In November 1992, the Advisory Task Force on the Juvenile Jus-
tice System was convened by order of the Minnesota Supreme Court, 
and charged by the Legislature to conduct a study of the juvenile 
justice system and to make recommendations based on these find-
ings.70   
The Task Force subsequently promulgated several key findings.  
First, the pattern of criminal behavior to which the juvenile justice 
system needed to respond had changed dramatically since the system 
was put in place.71  Second, community-based responses to juvenile 
crime were preferable to the institutionalization of juveniles.72  Third, 
and most significantly, Minnesotans wished to retain rehabilitation as 
one of the goals of the juvenile justice system and, therefore, found 
value in retaining a separate system of response to crime committed 
by juveniles.73  
 
Secret to His Peers, THE OREGONIAN, May 22, 1998 (Fifteen-year-old Kinkel killed four 
and injured twenty-two during a murder spree in his high school cafeteria.  Despite 
his widely-known obsession with death and violence, the signs were largely ignored). 
 69. C. Antoinette Clarke, The Baby and the Bathwater: Adolescent Offending and 
Punitive Juvenile Justice Reform, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 659, 674–75 (2005).  See also generally 
OJJDP REPORT, supra note 67 (offering background information and statistics 
regarding the increase in juvenile violent crimes and case studies of juvenile reform 
initiatives). 
 70. Symposium, Minnesota Supreme Court Advisory Task Force on the Juvenile Justice 
System: Final Report, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 595 (1994).   
This year-long study, requested in response to the concern about juvenile crime, is a 
comprehensive look at several significant aspects of Minnesota’s juvenile justice 
system. The Task Force’s legislative mandate was limited to consideration of several 
juvenile justice system procedural and policy matters, specific to the area of juvenile 
delinquency.   
Id. at 598.  The Task Force relied on “statistical data, expert testimony, information 
from site visits to residential placement facilities, information from other states, and 
public testimony.”  Id. at 599. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.  This attitude was reflected in a nationwide public opinion survey on 
juvenile crime conducted in 1991.  IRA M. SCHWARTZ, JUVENILE JUSTICE AND PUBLIC 
POLICY: TOWARD A NATIONAL AGENDA 214 (1992).  Of those surveyed, seventy-eight 
percent felt that the primary purpose of the juvenile court should be to treat and 
11
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This third finding was significant because it contravened the per-
ception that the rise in juvenile crime was best addressed by a more 
punitive system of juvenile justice, which was the legislative trend in 
many jurisdictions.74  The Task Force’s conclusions suggested that the 
old, seemingly obsolete doctrine of rehabilitation was still very much a 
part, if only a theoretical one, of juvenile justice and policy in 
Minnesota at the close of the twentieth century. 
2. Beyond Due Process for Juveniles: Minnesota’s Reaction to and 
Interpretation of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent 
The U.S. Supreme Court has applied a comparison between cul-
pability and punishment in order to implement the concept of the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.75  
This Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis requires a court to 
examine not only the crime’s gravity, but also the defendant’s relative 
culpability.76  In Atkins v. Virginia,77 the Court explained that the 
Eighth Amendment guarantees individuals the right to not be 
subjected to excessive sanctions in proportion to their culpability.78  
The Court held that because intellectually disabled adults were less 
culpable for their actions than the average adult offender, the 
imposition of the death penalty on this group violated the Eighth 
Amendment.79 
 The Supreme Court applied Atkins’s reasoning to juveniles in 
Roper v. Simmons.80  The Court referred to “‘the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’ to determine 
which punishments are so disproportionate as to be cruel and 
unusual.”81  By evaluating then-current sociological and scientific data 
and applying those findings to their proportionality framework, the 
Court concluded that juveniles could not be imputed to possess the 
same level of culpability as adult criminals.82  The Court also noted 
 
rehabilitate juveniles.  Id. at 216.  Only twelve percent felt that the purpose should be 
to punish them.  Id.  A small percentage, ten percent, indicated that it should serve 
both purposes equally.  Id. 
 74. See OJJDP REPORT, supra note 67, at Conclusions. 
 75. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  See also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 76.  536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 311. 
 79. Id. at 319. 
 80. 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding the death penalty, as applied to juveniles, 
unconstitutional). 
 81. Id. at 561 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958)). 
 82. Id. at 569–70 (asserting peer pressure, immaturity, and incomplete identity 
12
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voluminous literature indicating a near-universal trend in interna-
tional law rejecting capital punishment for juveniles.83  That the 
endorsement of the United States was so often conspicuously absent 
from these international dialogues clearly troubled the Court.84 
Based on these findings from the scientific, sociological, and in-
ternational communities, the Court concluded that the penological 
justifications for the death penalty did not align with punishments 
that were psychologically and socially appropriate for juveniles.85  The 
Roper majority commented, “Whether viewed as an attempt to express 
the community’s moral outrage or as an attempt to right the balance 
for the wrong to the victim, the case for retribution is not as strong 
with a minor as with an adult.”86  As for deterrence, the Court found 
little evidence to prove that the possibility of a punishment of death 
 
formation as the primary factors for diminished culpability). 
 83. Id. at 575–78.  On appeal to the Supreme Court, Simmons and a number of 
amici emphasized that Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child “contains an express prohibition on capital punishment for crimes 
committed by juveniles under 18.”  Id. at 576 (citing United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child art. 37, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 
Sept. 2, 1990)).  “[E]very country in the world has ratified” this resolution, “save for 
the United States and Somalia.”  Id.  Since 1990, “only seven countries other than the 
United States have executed juvenile offenders . . .: Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and China.”  Id. at 577.  Since 
1990, these countries have all either abolished capital punishment for juveniles or 
made it publicly apparent that the practice is disfavored.  Id.  “In sum,” wrote Justice 
Kennedy, “it is fair to say that the United States now stands alone in a world that has 
turned its face against the juvenile death penalty.”  Id. 
 84. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575.  “Our determination that the death penalty is 
disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark 
reality that the United States is the only country in the world that continues to give 
official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”  Id.  In addition to recent internation-
al precedent, the Court observed that  
[Al]though the international covenants prohibiting the juvenile death penalty are of 
more recent date, it is instructive to note that the United Kingdom abolished the 
juvenile death penalty before these covenants came into being. The United 
Kingdom’s experience bears particular relevance here in light of the historic ties 
between our countries and in light of the Eighth Amendment’s own origins. The 
Amendment was modeled on a parallel provision in the English Declaration of Rights 
of 1689, which provided: “[E]xcessive Bail ought not to be required nor excessive 
Fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual Punishments inflicted.” 1 W. & M., ch. 2, § 10, 
in 3 Eng. Stat. at Large 441 (1770). . . .  As of now, the United Kingdom has abolished 
the death penalty in its entirety; but, decades before it took this step, it recognized 
the disproportionate nature of the juvenile death penalty; and it abolished that 
penalty as a separate matter. 
Id. at 577.  
 85. See id. at 571. 
 86. Id. 
13
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induced a juvenile to change his or her behavior.87 
The opinion noted that juvenile offenders rarely, if ever, make 
“the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the 
possibility of execution.” 88  This, hinted the Court, rendered the 
juvenile death penalty “residual,” at best, in its deterrent power and 
effect.89  In concluding its analysis, the majority noted that, especially 
for the young, the sanction of life imprisonment without the possibili-
ty of parole was itself a serious deterrent.90   
The majority opinion articulated three fundamental differences 
between juveniles and adults, which precluded the application of 
“worst offender” status to juveniles.91  First, the Court asserted that 
juveniles were less responsible and less mature than adults.92  This was 
evidenced by the fact that they were not permitted to vote, serve on 
juries, or marry.93  The Court went on to say that youth tend to possess 
“[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibili-
ty . . . [which] result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and 
decisions.”94  Second, the Court noted that juveniles are “more 
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, 
including peer pressure.” 95  Third, “the character of a juvenile is not 
as well formed as that of an adult.”96  To the contrary, the Court 
described juveniles’ personality traits as “less fixed” and “more 
transitory” than those of adults.97 
These differences, together with the fact that a majority of the 
states had rejected the juvenile death penalty,98 led the Roper majority 
 
 87. Id. at 571–72.  See generally Elizabeth Cepparulo, Roper v. Simmons: Unveiling 
Juvenile Purgatory: Is Life Really Better Than Death?, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 225 
(2006) (advocating against mandatory LWOR for juvenile offenders). 
 88. Roper, 543 U.S. at 572 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 
(1988)). 
 89. See id.  
 90. Id.  Strong evidence exists that “adult time for adult crime” laws do little to 
decrease recidivism because juveniles sentenced as adults—and sent to adult 
prisons—are vulnerable to adult criminals and mentor-mentee relationships with 
more powerful inmates.  See REPORT BY THE COALITION FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, 
CHILDHOOD ON TRIAL: THE FAILURE OF TRYING AND SENTENCING YOUTH IN ADULT 
CRIMINAL COURT 23–25 (2005). 
 91. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 570. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 568.  Justice Kennedy wrote:   
As in Atkins, the objective indicia of consensus in this case—the rejection of the 
14
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to conclude that juveniles’ irresponsible conduct was less morally 
reprehensible than that of adults.99  The Court declared that the 
death penalty, as imposed on any juvenile offender under the age of 
eighteen, is a disproportionate punishment because their “culpability 
or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason 
of youth and immaturity.”100  The “marked” differences between 
juvenile and adult offenders, the Court found, underlie the notion 
that juveniles should be subjected to less severe sentences than adults 
for the same crimes.101 
Woven into the majority opinion in Roper was a nod to the rehabi-
litationist ideals that underlie the foundation of the first juvenile 
courts.102  The differences between adults and juveniles, the Roper 
majority deduced, meant that juveniles had a greater entitlement to 
forgiveness for becoming trapped amongst negative influences, and 
that they were less likely to be irreversibly depraved in character.103  
The Court further identified that only a small percentage of juveniles 
who engage in problematic behavior actually continued those 
patterns of behavior into adulthood.104  The Court saw juveniles as 
possessing a greater potential for reformation than adult offenders.105   
 The holding in Roper only addressed capital punishment of juve-
niles.106  However, as McNaughton pointed out, the Supreme Court 
has noted that the Eighth Amendment proportionality principle also 
applies to non-capital sentences.107  Thus, contend McNaughton and 
others, Roper’s rationale should be applied anytime a juvenile is 
subjected to punishments that are disproportionately harsh to their 
 
juvenile death penalty in the majority of States; the infrequency of its use even where 
it remains on the books; and the consistency in the trend toward abolition of the 
practice—provide sufficient evidence that today our society views juveniles, in the 
words Atkins used respecting the mentally retarded, as “categorically less culpable 
than the average criminal.” 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 99. Id. at 570 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988)). 
 100. Id. at 571. 
 101. Id. at 572–73. 
 102. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 103. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. 
 104. Id. (quoting Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmen-
tal Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 575. 
 107. See McNaughton, supra note 29, at 1067 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 
U.S. 957, 997–98 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
15
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level of culpability.108 
In State v. Behl,109 the statute in question automatically waived the 
juvenile court’s jurisdiction over juveniles sixteen and seventeen years 
old who have been indicted for first-degree murder.110  Under the rule 
in place when Behl was decided, automatic certification terminates 
juvenile court jurisdiction over all of the proceedings arising out of 
the same behavioral incident.111  While that procedure withstood the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s constitutional scrutiny, the Roper 
rationale calls Behl’s holding into question.  
However, the Behl court evaluated Minnesota’s automatic certifi-
cation statutes solely from a sentencing or punishment perspective.  
The court based its holding on the notion that “juveniles over the age 
of 16 who have undertaken conduct sufficient to invoke an indict-
ment for first-degree murder, are more dangerous and less amenable 
to the treatment provided by the juvenile system.”112  Whether the 
indictment without any judicial review was constitutional was not 
sufficiently considered.  Moreover, the court failed to consider 
juveniles’ diminished culpability as a factor in its proportionality 
analysis, contrary to the Supreme Court’s mandate in Roper.113  
 Under Minnesota statute, juveniles of a certain age are presump-
tively certified as adults if the crime of which they are accused is 
serious enough.114  Clearly, from time to time, there will be horrible, 
unspeakable acts committed by juveniles.  But a certification process 
involving individualized consideration of each accused child’s unique 
circumstances would find those persons in adult court anyway.  The 
“automatic” nature of the Minnesota rule does not incorporate the 
three cognitive differences between juveniles and adults set forth as 
controlling precedent in Roper.  The Minnesota Supreme Court had 
an opportunity in Behl to appeal to that sacred notion of checks and 
balances and alert the legislature that the automatic certification 
 
 108. Id. at 1067–68. 
 109. 564 N.W.2d 560 (Minn. 1997). 
 110. MINN. STAT. §§ 260.015, subdiv. 5(b), .111 subdiv. 1a (1998) (repealed 1999) 
(current version at MINN. STAT. §§ 260B.007, subdiv. 6(b), .101 subdiv. 2 (2008)). 
 111. Behl, 564 N.W.2d at 563 (citing MINN. R. JUV. P. 18.08, subdiv. 1). 
 112. Id. at 568.  Cf. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 543 (1966).  This same 
“amenability” language (i.e., to juvenile programming and facilities) caught the 
Supreme Court’s attention and prompted it to vacate Kent’s conviction because of 
the arbitrariness of the judicial waiver proceeding at which he was transferred from 
juvenile court to adult criminal court.  See also supra notes 36–42 and accompanying 
text.  
 113. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005). 
 114. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.125, subdiv. 3 (2008). 
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statute usurped what had traditionally been the court’s authority, but 
the court declined to do so.  Instead, the Behl court allowed automatic 
certification to replace individualized decision-making.115 
Two other cases, State v. Mitchell116 and State v. Chambers,117 are 
important in understanding the history of juvenile justice in Minneso-
ta.  In Mitchell, the Minnesota Supreme Court announced that the 
state constitution provides more protection because the disjunctive 
“or” allows a court to prohibit a punishment if it is cruel or unusual.118   
In Chambers, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld life without 
release as applied to a seventeen-year-old offender.119  The court 
acknowledged that it would have applied the required analysis to 
determine “the proportionality of the crime to the punishment”120 
but “Chambers d[id] not dispute that a sentence of life imprisonment 
[was] proportionate to the heinous crime of first-degree murder of a 
peace officer [the crime of which he was convicted].”121   
Because this case preceded Roper, the court was not obligated to 
take up the proportionality issue if the defendant did not argue the 
issue.122  To determine whether the sentence was cruel and unusual, 
the court looked to the “evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”123  That Chambers was the only 
individual to be sentenced to LWOR for a crime committed when he 
was under the age of eighteen did not, held the Chambers court, result 
in a constitutional violation.124 
Chambers, however, is significant because of its legislative intent 
analysis, which the court uses to flesh out its “evolving standards of 
decency” test.125  This “analysis” culminates with the conclusion that 
“the legislature intended the mandatory sentence of life imprison-
ment without possibility of release to apply to [seventeen]-year-olds 
convicted of first-degree murder of a peace officer.”126  The Minnesota 
 
 115. See Behl, 564 N.W.2d at 568–69. 
 116. 577 N.W.2d 481 (Minn. 1998). 
 117. 589 N.W.2d 466 (Minn. 1999). 
 118. See Mitchell, 577 N.W.2d at 488.  See also supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 119. Chambers, 589 N.W.2d at 480. 
 120. Id. (quoting Mitchell, 577 N.W.2d at 489). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Brief of Appellant at 22, State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89 (Minn. 2009) (No. 
A07-1262), 2008 WL 7212055 (citing Chambers, 589 N.W.2d at 473). 
 123. Chambers, 589 N.W.2d at 480 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 
(1958)). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id.   
17
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Supreme Court had an opportunity to exercise its checks-and-
balances functions, and to call attention to a potential legislative 
infraction—the automatic sentencing law.  Alternatively, or in 
addition, the court could have pointed out to the legislature the 
erosion of ideals underlying the juvenile justice system in Minnesota 
as evidenced by its ever-harsher treatment of juvenile offenders.  
Instead, the court invoked some kind of vague, utopian standard of 
omniscience-generated legislative productivity gleaned from a case 
decided in the early 1950s,127 and noted in dicta that some recent 
legislative developments could only have been the products of a 
legislature clearly eclipsing a forty-year-old high-water mark for the 
Minnesota Legislature.  Specifically, the court noted that the legisla-
ture amended Minnesota Statute section 609.184, subdivision 2 
(1993), to impose a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without 
possibility of release for a conviction under Minnesota Statute section 
609.185 (1993).128  Then, two years later, the legislature amended 
Minnesota Statute section 260.115, subdivision 1 (1998), to require 
automatic district court jurisdiction over sixteen- and seventeen-year-
olds charged with first-degree murder.129 
 
3. A Problematic Statutory Scheme in Minnesota 
While rehabilitation remained an ideological goal, attaining it 
became even more difficult for many juvenile court jurisdictions.  
Either in response to fiscal or personnel shortages, or because some 
jurisdictions take a more hard-nosed approach to juvenile crime, 
virtually all U.S. jurisdictions employ mechanisms to transfer juveniles 
out of juvenile courts and into adult criminal court.130  Most common-
 
 127. The Chambers court presumed that “these amendments were passed by the 
legislature ‘with deliberation and full knowledge of all existing legislation on the 
subject and regarded by the lawmakers as being part of a connected whole.’”  Kaljuste 
v. Hennepin County Sanatorium Comm’n, 240 Minn. 407, 414, 61 N.W.2d 757, 762 
(1953) quoted in Chambers, 589 N.W.2d at 480.  The court uses the Kaljuste case, a 
worker’s compensation matter, to explain why they did not reproach the Legislature 
on this troubling convergence of statutes.  See Chambers, 589 N.W.2d at 480. 
 128. Chambers, 589 N.W.2d at 480.  See Act of May 20, 1993, ch. 326, art. 4, § 15, 
1993 Minn. Laws 1974, 2030. 
 129. Chambers, 589 N.W.2d at 480; see also  Act of May 25, 1995, ch. 226, art. 3, 
§ 17, 1995 Minn. Laws 1753, 1806-07. 
 130. Melissa Sickmund, Juveniles in Court, in Juvenile Offenders and Victims 
National Report Series Bulletin 6 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention) (OJJDP) (2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/ojjdp/195420.pdf.  See also U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to 
18
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ly, this mechanism is judicial waiver—a process through which judges, 
at their discretion, may waive juvenile cases into adult court.131   
In Minnesota, there is a presumption of certification as an adult 
if the child was sixteen or seventeen at the time of the offense and 
either the sentencing guidelines create a presumption of commitment 
to prison or the child committed the alleged felony offense using a 
firearm.132  Thus, the statute presumptively waives the juvenile court’s 
jurisdiction over juveniles sixteen and seventeen years old who have 
been indicted for first-degree murder.133  With presumptive certifica-
tion, the burden at the certification hearing shifts to the defendant 
juvenile to show why the case should not be certified to adult criminal 
court.134   
When the circumstances allow presumptive certification, the 
prosecutor may choose to initiate a process called “direct file.” 135  This 
process simply involves a motion asking the juvenile court to certify 
the juvenile as an adult or into extended juvenile jurisdiction (EJJ).136  
 
Congressional Requesters, Juvenile Justice: Juveniles Processed in Criminal Court and 
Case Dispositions 1 (1995), available at http://www.nicic.org/Library/012591; OJJDP 
Report, supra note 67. 
 131. OJJDP Report, supra note 67, at 42. 
 132. MINN. STAT. § 260B.125, subdiv. 3 (2008).  
Presumption of certification.  It is presumed that a proceeding involving an offense 
committed by a child will be certified if: (1) the child was 16 or 17 years old at the 
time of the offense; and (2) the delinquency petition alleges that the child committed 
an offense that would result in a presumptive commitment to prison under the 
Sentencing Guidelines and applicable statutes, or that the child committed any felony 
offense while using, whether by brandishing, displaying, threatening with, or 
otherwise employing, a firearm. If the court determines that probable cause exists to 
believe the child committed the alleged offense, the burden is on the child to rebut 
this presumption by demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that retaining 
the proceeding in the juvenile court serves public safety. If the court finds that the 
child has not rebutted the presumption by clear and convincing evidence, the court 
shall certify the proceeding.   
MINN. STAT. § 260B.125, subdiv. 3 (2008). 
 133. MINN. STAT. § 260B.007 (2008).   This statute’s predecessor was upheld in 
State v. Behl, 564 N.W.2d 560 (Minn. 1997). 
 134. Id.  
 135. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.125, subdiv. 3 (2008).   
 136. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.130 (2008).  EJJ (or, as it is sometimes referred, 
“blended sentencing”) in Minnesota,  
emerged as a political compromise between those who wanted to emphasize public 
safety, punishment, and accountability of juvenile offenders, and those who wanted to 
maintain or strengthen the traditional juvenile justice system. EJJs are initially 
adjudicated and sentenced as juveniles though they receive all adult criminal 
procedural safeguards, including the right to a jury trial.  Juveniles disposed EJJ 
receive a juvenile court disposition and a stayed adult prison sentence, based upon 
the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines for adult felons.  The jurisdiction of the 
19
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“Selection of the final dispositional alternative . . . is usually nego-
tiated between the county attorney and defense attorneys,137 subject to 
the approval of the judge.”138  Under “direct file” circumstances, the 
county attorney alone makes the critical initial decision as to whether 
or not to turn the juvenile into an EJJ proceeding.139  The benefits of 
an EJJ proceeding to a qualifying juvenile come in the way a sentence 
is rendered upon conviction: the court imposes the appropriate 
juvenile dispositions under statute,140 and it simultaneously stays the 
execution of an accompanying adult criminal sentence.141 
 However, EJJ procedures—or indeed certification processes of 
any kind—never apply to juveniles accused of murder who were 
sixteen or older at the time of the alleged offense.142  Under the 
circumstances of Martin’s case, certification as an adult was of a more 
automatic nature.  The crime for which he was convicted and his age 
precluded classification as a “delinquent child,”143 and consideration 
of the individual factors of his case was prohibited. 
A juvenile accused of first-degree murder should be entitled to 
 
juvenile court lasts until age twenty-one, hence the name “extended jurisdiction” 
juvenile.  A court executes the stayed criminal sentence only if the EJJ fails in juvenile 
probation.   
Fred L. Cheesman II et al., National Center for State Courts & Minnesota Supreme 
Court State Court Administrator’s Office, Blended Sentencing in Minnesota: On 
Target for Justice and Public Safety?  An Evaluation E-7 (2002) [hereinafter Blended 
Sentencing].  
 137. BLENDED SENTENCING, supra note 136, at E-10.   
 138. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subdiv. 1 (2008) (declaring that a proceeding “is 
an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution” if the child was sixteen or seventeen at 
the time of the alleged offense, the Sentencing Guidelines create a presumption of a 
prison sentence or the felony involved firearms, and the prosecutor designated the 
proceeding as an EJJ prosecution in the delinquency petition) (emphasis added). 
 139. BLENDED SENTENCING, supra note 136, at E-9. 
 140. See MINN. STAT. 260B.198 (2008).  These punishments, by design, are milder 
and of a more rehabilitative nature than those imposed on adults. 
 141. MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subdiv. 4 (2008).  The adult sentence could be 
executed by the court, without notice, if a person convicted as an EJJ juvenile violates 
the conditions of the stayed sentence or is alleged to have committed a new offense.  
 142. MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subdiv. 6 (2008).   
 143. What some call “automatic waiver” or “automatic certification” (see State v. 
Behl, 564 N.W.2d 560, 563 (Minn. 1997)) is really a jurisdictional matter created by 
the jurisdiction set out in section 260B.101 and definition of “delinquent child” in 
section 260B.007, subdivision 6 (formerly at section 260.015).  Section 260B.101, 
subdivision 2, explicitly excludes jurisdiction over anyone covered by section 
260B.007, subdivision 6(b), which says that anyone sixteen years old or older who is 
alleged to have committed murder is not a “delinquent child.”  Thus the statutory 
definition of “delinquent child” deprives juvenile court of jurisdiction, and such 
defendants must be tried in criminal court.  See also supra note 25 and accompanying 
text. 
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individualized consideration by the court to determine whether adult 
or juvenile court is the proper venue even if they are an older 
juvenile, like Martin.  The seriousness of such a charge is indisputable, 
and a juvenile’s circumstances may be deemed, after individual 
contemplation, to justify certification.  Adult court, however, should 
not be the automatic response to such serious allegations against a 
juvenile.  This is especially true when the age of the offender and the 
crime for which he or she is convicted are the only criteria considered 
in determining whether or not a juvenile is “fit” for adult court.  And 
once the defendant is certified as an adult and convicted in adult 
court, the crime can, by statute, dictate a sentence of life without 
release—which can be imposed on the juvenile offender without a 
sentencing hearing of any kind.144  This is the precise statutory 
framework under which Lamonte Martin’s case has developed.  
III. THE MARTIN DECISION 
A. Facts 
On May 3, 2006, ten-year-old S.H. witnessed a shooting from his 
back porch.145  Christopher Lynch, the victim of the shooting, and his 
cousin, Jermaine Mack-Lynch, watched a white Chevy Malibu slow 
down and stop nearby.146  Three members from what was alleged to be 
a rival gang, the 19 Block Dipset (19s), were passengers in the car.147  
Once the occupants of the car identified Lynch and Mack-Lynch, they 
exited the car and began chasing them.148  Lynch was shot after he 
and Mack-Lynch separated—Lynch stopped because he was out of 
breath,149 and Mack-Lynch kept running down the alley, thinking their 
pursuers would follow him instead of Lynch because Mack-Lynch was 
a member of the Tre Tre, a rival gang of the 19s.150 
Mack-Lynch doubled back to the front of his brother’s house, 
and told him that “One Nines” were following him.151  They heard 
 
 144. See MINN. STAT. § 609.185, subdiv. a(1) (2008). 
 145. State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 96 (Minn. 2009). 
 146. Id. at 95. 
 147. Id. at 96. 
 148. Id.  
 149. “Christopher said he was tired and wanted to cut through the yard: he had 
asthma and was overweight.  Jermaine decided to keep running straight through the 
alley so that the others would chase him instead of Christopher.”  Appellant’s Brief at 
7, Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89 (No. A07-1262)(citations omitted). 
 150. Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 96. 
 151. Id. 
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gunshots and saw Lamonte Martin and Cornelius Jackson across the 
street firing handguns into a nearby backyard.152  A fraction of a 
second later, S.H. saw Lynch get hit153 by bullets fired from a 9-
millimeter and 10-millimeter, according to the gun casings found at 
the scene.154  Martin and Jackson jumped into the Malibu and drove 
away.155  Mack-Lynch and his brother ran across the street to find 
Lynch in the backyard, seriously wounded.156  At the scene, Mack-
Lynch’s brother told police that Martin and “Jonar” had shot at 
him.157  He was quite reluctant, however, to talk to the police.158 
At a house in north Minneapolis, widely reputed to be a hangout 
for 19s, Lamonte Martin was arrested on May 5, 2006, three days after 
the shooting.159 
B. The Failure of Trying 
At Martin’s trial in Hennepin County, “most of the state’s wit-
nesses were gang members with past or pending criminal cases” who 
testified that Martin, Jackson, and their co-defendant McDaniel160 
made admissions to them about their involvement in Lynch’s 
murder.161  Renardo Smith reached a deal with federal prosecutors by 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Appellant’s Brief at 8, Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89 (No. A07-1262). 
 155. Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 96. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Appellant’s Brief at 8, Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89 (No. A07-1262). 
 158. Id.  The majority opinion in Martin noted the following about Mack-Lynch’s 
interactions with law enforcement: 
During an interview with the police that same day [the day of Lynch’s murder], Pettis 
[Mack-Lynch’s brother] denied knowing the identity of the shooters.  But when the 
investigator left the interview room, Pettis stated in a phone call to a third party: “I 
know who did it” but “like I’d really tell these motherf * * *ers [police] who shot my 
cousin.”  According to Pettis, he lied to the police because he “wanted to deal with it 
my way” by “getting revenge . . . on the street.”  Subsequently, Pettis saw physical 
evidence from the murder scene, changed his mind, and decided to cooperate.   
Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 96.  See also Appellant’s Brief at 9, Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89 (No. 
A07-1262) (supporting Martin majority’s factual account). 
 159. Appellant’s Brief at 8, Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89 (No. A07-1262).  The police 
never found the white Malibu allegedly used by Lynch’s shooters.  Id.  It was not 
registered to Martin’s mother or to her husband.  Id.  No neighbors reported ever 
seeing such a car.  Id.  A ballistics expert later determined that two discharged 
cartridge casings found at the scene were fired from a 10-millimeter Smith & Wesson 
located in another gang member’s car.  Id.  A Glock-9-millimeter was also found in 
that car, and shells from that gun were also found at the murder scene.  Id.     
 160. Id. at 9. 
 161. Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 96. 
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agreeing to testify against Martin in exchange for a reduction in his 
sentence for a federal drug charge.162  For his part of the bargain, 
Smith told authorities that a cousin of McDaniel, a member of the 
19s, had told Smith that police had been looking for McDaniel, and 
had stopped by the local hangout.163 Later, Smith told McDaniel what 
the 19er had said about the police stopping by.164  At that point, 
McDaniel referred to the shooting and mentioned that he had only 
been the driver.165 
The same prosecutor who prosecuted Martin’s case in Hennepin 
County dismissed a pending second-degree assault charge for Paris 
Patton, another witness for the state in Martin’s case.  Patton’s charge 
was dismissed in July 2006 and Martin’s trial did not begin until 
January 2007, but it is a reasonable inference that an arrangement was 
made in exchange for Patton’s testimony.166  Patton may also have 
received a sentence reduction motion in federal court.167  Patton 
testified that he had spoken with McDaniel after the shooting.  
McDaniel told him that he (McDaniel) wanted a gun because he had 
used his to “shoot a boy walking with Jermaine.”168 
Kiron Williams, a convicted felon, testified next.169  Williams was 
in federal custody on narcotics charges.170  He testified that Martin 
and Jackson “bragged to him about chasing . . . Mack-Lynch and 
Lynch, that Mack-Lynch got away, and then he caught up with Lynch, 
who pleaded for his life before he was shot.”171  He went on to say that 
Martin wanted Williams to help him hide because he knew the police 
were after him.172  Interestingly, Williams did not make these allega-
tions until he spoke with officers in February 2007.173  He said that it 
had “slipped his mind” when he first spoke with officers a month 
earlier.174 
 
 162. Appellant’s Brief at 9, Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89 (No. A07-1262).  
 163. Id. at 9–10 (citations omitted). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 10 (citations omitted). 
 166. Id. (citing Transcript, supra note 3, at 1756).   
 167. Id. (citing Transcript, supra note 3, at 1698). 
 168. Id. (citing Transcript, supra note 3, at 1729). 
 169. Id. at 11 (citing Transcript, supra note 3, at 1869). 
 170. State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 96 (Minn. 2009). 
 171. Id. at 96–97. 
 172. Appellant’s Brief at 11, Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89 (No. A07-1262) (citing 
Transcript, supra note 3, at 1885).  Williams said that Martin pointed out the crime 
scene, distinguished by the crime-scene tape, shortly after the shooting.  Id. (citing 
Transcript, supra note 3, at 1886). 
 173. Id. (citing Transcript, supra note 3, at 1915). 
 174. Id. (citing Transcript, supra note 3, at 1915). 
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To bolster the second count of the indictment—crime commit-
ted for the benefit of a gang (with an underlying crime of premedi-
tated murder)—the State called Minneapolis Police Captain Michael 
Martin, a member of the special operations division, as its gang 
expert.175  Captain Martin “opined that the 19 Block Dipset was a gang 
in north Minneapolis whose color was pink and whose rivals were the 
Murder Squad, Emerson Murder Boys, and Tre Tre Crips.”176  Accord-
ing to Captain Martin, gangs may engage in assaults, drug trafficking, 
and “drive-by’s.”177  He stated that “retaliation and respect are ‘the 
foundation for the gang culture.’”178  He could not, however, provide 
detailed information about the timing and structure of the 19s’ 
organization.179 
On March 6, 2007, the jury returned a guilty verdict on both 
counts.180  On March 28, 2007, Martin was sentenced on Count I (first-
degree premeditated murder) to life without parole (no possibility of 
release).181  Martin filed his notice of appeal on June 26, 2007,182 and 
the Supreme Court of Minnesota heard oral arguments regarding 
Martin’s appeal on January 14, 2009.183 
C. The Martin Majority 
1. Statutory Structure 
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed Martin’s conviction in 
an opinion released on October 8, 2009.184  In addressing Martin’s 
claim that sentencing a juvenile (at the time the crime was commit-
ted) to life in prison without the possibility of release under Minneso-
ta law185 violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel 
 
 175. Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 97. 
 176. Brief of Appellant at 11, Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89 (No. A07-1262). 
 177. Id. at 11 (citing Transcript, supra note 3, at 2058).   
 178. Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 97. 
 179. Brief of Appellant at 11–12, Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89 (No. A07-1262). 
 180. Id. at 2. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id.  
 183. See State of Minnesota, Supreme Court Calendar January 2009, at 3, 
http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public/Calendars/January_2009.pdf.  
 184. State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 89 (Minn. 2009). 
 185. See MINN. STAT. §§ 260B.007, subdiv. 6(b) (2008) (excluding those “alleged to 
have committed murder in the first degree after becoming 16 years of age” from 
definition of delinquent child); § 260B.101, subdiv. 1 (2008) (giving the juvenile 
court original and exclusive jurisdiction only in proceedings concerning children 
alleged to be delinquent). 
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and unusual punishment, the court indicated that the constitutionali-
ty of statutes was a question reviewed de novo.186  This was effectively 
the end of the court’s discussion of Minnesota’s statutory scheme. 
2. Eighth Amendment: “Cruel or Unusual” and/or “Cruel and 
 Unusual” 
Martin urged the court to consider that the differences between 
juveniles under eighteen and adults render them “less responsible for 
their conduct than adults and, therefore, a sentence of LWOR is 
unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment.”187  Chambers, 
Martin argued, should be overruled in light of Roper.188  The court, 
however, latched on to the Roper court’s statement that “LWOR for a 
juvenile is a more palatable alternative to the juvenile death penal-
ty.”189  Roper, the Minnesota court concluded, does not provide a 
compelling reason to overrule Chambers.190  
The Martin majority seems nonplussed by Martin’s arguments 
that there is an emerging consensus—an evolving standard of 
decency—against sentencing juveniles to LWOR.191  As Roper pointed 
out, the Martin majority notes that only seven states prohibit juvenile 
LWOR.192  Additionally, after the Supreme Court’s 1989 decision in 
Stanford v. Kentucky193 affirming the death penalty for juveniles, only a 
few were executed before that case was overruled by Roper in 2005.194  
The Martin majority contrasts this small figure with that of the 2484 
juvenile offenders serving LWOR,195 and concludes that Martin did 
not present sufficient evidence to show an emerging consensus 
against sentencing juveniles to LWOR.196 
The court also declines to be swayed by the Roper court’s marshal-
ing of facts and figures.  As the Martin majority noted, “While the 
 
 186. Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 97. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 97-98. 
 189. Id. at 98 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005)). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. (citing Human Rights Watch, Executive Summary, The Rest of Their 
Lives: Life Without Parole for Youth Offenders in the United States 3 (2008), available 
at www.hrw.org/backgrounder/2008/us1005/us1005execsum.pdf [hereinafter 
Executive Summary]). 
 192. Id. 
 193. 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 194. Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 98 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 
(2005)). 
 195. Id. (citing to EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 191). 
 196. Id. 
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Court did look at international law in Roper, it did so for ‘confirma-
tion’ of its determination, specifically stating that ‘[t]his reality does 
not become controlling, for the task of interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment remains our responsibility.’”197  
Martin also asserted that the Minnesota Constitution prohibits 
cruel or unusual punishments, meaning that the court should 
prohibit a punishment if it is either cruel or unusual.198  In response, 
the court pointed out that the cases Martin used to support his 
contention involved as-applied challenges brought by juvenile 
offenders younger than Martin.199  The court observed that “states 
with similar constitutions” have found LWOR unconstitutional as 
applied to juveniles under the age of sixteen, but Martin was six weeks 
away from his eighteenth birthday.200  Because Martin did not offer 
direct authority to support his contention that LWOR is unconstitu-
tional for a seventeen-year-old, his sentence was held to be constitu-
tional.201  So concludes Part I of the Martin opinion. 
Parts II through VI set forth the court’s responses to procedural 
issues brought by Martin on appeal.  In Part II, the majority addressed 
the joinder of Martin’s trial with that of a co-defendant.  The court 
opined that the potential trauma to S.H., the ten-year-old who saw the 
murder from his porch, would have increased considerably if separate 
trials had been ordered.202  It concluded that no substantial prejudice 
resulted from the joinder, so the cases were properly joined for trial.203 
Part III addressed Martin’s argument that the district court erred 
in sustaining the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge of a prospective 
juror.  That juror, an African American, expressed his belief that the 
system was unfair to African Americans.204  The state made its peremp-
tory challenge, and subsequently the defense asserted a challenge 
pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky.205  This portion of the court’s analysis 
was the lengthiest, as it had to address how the trial court handled the 
 
 197. Id. at n.3 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 575). 
 198. Id. at 98–99; see also supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 199. Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 99 (citing People v. Miller, 781 N.E.2d 300 (Ill. 2002); 
Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968); Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 
944 (Nev. 1989)). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 100.  
 203. Id.  
 204. Id. at 101–02. 
 205. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (establishing a three-step framework for determining 
whether a peremptory challenge is motivated by racial discrimination). 
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three steps of the Batson framework.206  The majority concluded that 
the district court followed the Batson procedure appropriately, and 
that its decision to sustain the state’s peremptory challenge to the 
juror at trial was not clearly erroneous.207 
D. The Martin Dissent 
The dissent in Martin addressed solely the issue of the Batson 
challenge at trial.208  It concluded that the views expressed by the 
prospective juror during jury selection, which formed the basis for the 
prosecution’s peremptory challenge, were “consistent with what this 
court has found in its own review of whether African Americans are 
treated unfairly in our judicial system.”209  Such views, the dissent 
continued, “cannot constitute a legitimate non-discriminatory reason 
that would support the juror’s exclusion.”210   
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE MARTIN DECISION 
A. “Play it Close to the Vest”—The Inspiration for Justice Page’s Dissent? 
The Martin dissent was sufficient in its analysis of the Batson sce-
nario that played out during trial, but its reluctance to take up any 
constitutional issues made it a disappointing though well-reasoned 
end following the majority’s unremarkable beginning.  Addressing 
substantive constitutional issues, of course, is within the court’s 
purview, and either the majority or dissent could have commented on 
the unconstitutionality of juvenile LWOR sentencing, or on the 
troubling statutory convergence currently in effect in Minnesota.  A 
statement or two about the historic foundations of juvenile justice, or 
the direction in which it seems to be headed—assessed either from a 
state-specific or national vantage point—would have been appropri-
ate.  
The issue of juvenile LWOR is currently being considered by the 
U.S. Supreme Court, and an opinion could be forthcoming in the 
2010 session.  In November 2009, the Court heard oral arguments in 
two separate cases from Florida in which two men, juveniles at the 
 
 206. Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 102–04. 
 207. Id. at 104; see generally Batson, 476 U.S. 79 (1992). 
 208. Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 110 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
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time of their crimes, were sentenced to life in prison.211  Should the 
Court revive the “evolving standards of decency” gauge employed in 
Roper to determine the fate of these Florida men, it may well look to 
states that have recently dealt with the issue.”212  A dissent highlighting 
or commenting on some of the constitutional or statutory conver-
gence issues present in Martin’s case would have alerted the U.S. 
Supreme Court to some compelling concerns about juvenile LWOR 
in Minnesota, and across the country. 
B. Majority Rules: Justice Dietzen Throws Away the Key 
In nine succinct paragraphs, the Martin majority dismisses Mar-
tin’s claims that LWOR as applied to a seventeen-year-old is cruel and 
unusual.213  In declining to overrule Chambers, the court effectively 
ignores the veritable mountain of scientific research presented in 
Roper that established quite conclusively that juveniles’ culpability is 
mitigated by the very fact that they are juveniles.214   
It also ignores the emerging consensus among other states 
against juvenile LWOR.  In Naovarath v. State,215 for example, the 
Nevada Supreme Court reversed a sentence of life without parole for 
a juvenile found guilty of murder.216  The Nevada constitution, like 
that of Minnesota, prohibits cruel or unusual punishment.217  
Similarly, in Workman v. Commonwealth,218 the Kentucky Supreme 
Court held a sentence of life imprisonment without parole to be 
unconstitutional as applied to a fourteen-year-old.219  That court noted 
that the sentence of LWOR “shocks the general conscience of society 
today and is intolerable to fundamental fairness,” and that while “the 
intent of the legislature in providing a penalty of life imprisonment 
without benefit of parole . . . undoubtedly was to deal with dangerous 
and incorrigible individuals who would be a constant threat to 
 
 211. Sullivan v. Florida, 987 So.2d 83 (Fla. 1 Dist. Ct. App. 2008), cert. granted, 129 
S. Ct. 2157 (2009) (U.S. May 4, 2009) (No. 08-7621); Graham v. Florida, 982 So.2d 43 
(Fla. 2 Dist. Ct. App. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2157 (2009) (U.S. May 4, 2009) 
(No. 08-7412). 
 212. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005). 
 213. Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 97–99. 
 214. See Roper, 543 U.S. 551. 
 215. 779 P.2d 944 (Nev. 1989). 
 216. Id. (finding that sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole 
imposed on thirteen-year-old defendant was cruel and unusual under both Federal 
and Nevada Constitutions). 
 217. NEV. CONST. art. I, § 6; see also supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 218. 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968). 
 219. Id. at 378. 
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society[,] . . . incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.”220   
Using similar reasoning, the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. 
Miller221 declined to impose the sentence of LWOR on a fifteen-year-
old, despite the fact that such a sentence was mandated by state 
statute.222  The court also noted that the statutes do not permit 
consideration of the actual facts of the crime, including the defen-
dant’s age or individual level of culpability.223  Further, it found that 
the sentence mandated by statute was “unconstitutionally dispropor-
tionate.”224  The Miller court’s decision reveals that constitutional 
problems are inherent in any system in which juveniles are tried as 
adults and no consideration is given to the juvenile’s competency, 
culpability, and capacity for the offense, or the juvenile’s role in its 
attempt or completion.225  
The Martin majority distinguishes all of these holdings by noting 
that the defendants in those cases were all under the age of sixteen—
younger than Martin, who was almost eighteen at the time of the 
crime.226  So his situation could not possibly have had anything in 
common with the thirteen-, fourteen-, and fifteen-year-olds in 
Naovarath, Workman, and Miller, respectively.   
But the Martin court neglects to point out the similarity in statu-
tory schemes between the Miller and Martin cases.  The Miller court 
noted that the faulty legislative framework, under which the Illinois 
LWOR sentence resulted, came from “three converging statutes” 
which, cumulatively, left no room for justice to function.227  First, an 
automatic transfer provision put fifteen- and sixteen-year-old in adult 
court without any individual consideration of the maturity of the 
defendant.228  A second statute required that the court consider the 
defendant, who had not been the shooter, “equal to the actual 
shooter” and thus required the juvenile defendant to be tried as if he 
were the adult shooter.229  Third, just as in Minnesota, a sentencing 
statute required a mandatory life sentence and did not allow the court 
to consider any mitigating factors, including age or defendant’s 
 
 220. Id. 
 221. 781 N.E.2d 300 (Ill. 2002). 
 222. Id.  
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 341. 
 225. Id. 
 226. State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 99 (Minn. 2009). 
 227. See Miller, 781 N.E.2d at 340. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
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participation, when deciding how to sentence the juvenile.230   
The Illinois court concluded that the legislative scheme 
eliminates the court’s ability to consider any mitigating fac-
tors such as age or degree of participation.  A life sentence 
without the possibility of parole implies that under any cir-
cumstances a juvenile defendant convicted solely by accoun-
tability is incorrigible and incapable of rehabilitation for the 
rest of his life.  The trial judge in this case did not agree with 
such a blanket proposition.231   
Illinois, Connecticut, Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, and 
Minnesota are the only states to have statutory schemes under which a 
juvenile is mandatorily certified as an adult and mandatorily sen-
tenced to life without release. 232  Because of this, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court could have addressed, at the very least, the issue of 
statutory convergence in Minnesota in its Martin opinion. 
C. More on this Later: How Forthcoming U.S. Supreme Court Opinions 
Could Shake Up the Martin Holding 
In May 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in two 
Florida cases, Sullivan v. Florida233 and Graham v. Florida.234  Both of 
these cases involve LWOR sentences imposed on juveniles subsequent 
to their convictions for rape and armed robbery, respectively.  The 
Court heard arguments on November 9, 2009.  Joe Sullivan, now 
thirty-three, was convicted of sexual battery at age thirteen and 
sentenced to life without parole.235  He was with two older accomplices 
at the time of the crime, and it was their testimony that primarily 
convicted him.236  Though it was Sullivan’s first felony conviction, he 
was sentenced to life in prison without parole.237  His court-appointed 
lawyer filed no appeals on Sullivan’s behalf238 and was later dis-
barred.239   
 
 230. Id.  See MINN. STAT. § 609.185 (2008). 
 231. Miller, 781 N.E.2d at 343–43. 
 232. Appellant’s Brief at 24, State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89 (Minn. 2009) (No. 
A07-1262). 
 233. 987 So. 2d 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2157 (2009) 
(No. 08-7621). 
 234. 982 So. 2d 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2157 (2009) 
(No. 08-7412). 
 235. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Sullivan, 129 S. Ct. 2157 (No. 08-7621). 
 236. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Sullivan, 129 S. Ct. 2157 (No. 08-7621). 
 237. Id. at 6. 
 238. Id. 
 239. See Equal Justice Initiative, http://eji.org/eji/childrenprison/deathinprison/
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Terrance Graham, at age sixteen, participated in a robbery dur-
ing which an accomplice hit the store manager with a metal pipe.240  
While on probation for that crime, he was arrested as he fled the 
scene of another armed robbery.241  Though technically a probation 
violation, Graham’s conviction for this crime resulted in a sentence of 
life without release.242  That sentence is interesting because the 
Florida Department of Corrections had recommended that Graham 
receive a sentence of four years in prison, or twenty-four months in 
prison and twenty-four months of community service.243   
Neither Sullivan’s nor Graham’s crimes involved a death.  Yet 
both defendants were sentenced to the very same punishment 
imposed on the most heinous murderers in jurisdictions that have 
outlawed the death penalty.  Certainly the state should be allowed to 
seek retribution, even on behalf of the victims of crimes, capital or 
not.  But one must wonder if the system is working as well as it could 
when a juvenile is sentenced to life in prison forever—without even a 
chance at release—as a result of a probation violation.  During oral 
argument in Sullivan, Justice Stephen Breyer explained that an “area 
of ambiguity” encompasses the issue of what justifies a sentence of life 
without release or parole in a particular juvenile case.244  There are 
those who advocate for a bright-line rule that no person under 
eighteen should be sentenced to life without release, and those who 
support a system in which a particular crime, regardless of its 
perpetrator, triggers a particular punishment.  In line with this latter 
perspective, homicide, if committed by a juvenile or an adult, might 
mean a sentence of LWOR for both age groups, if that is an option in 
that jurisdiction.  
If the Supreme Court holds in the Florida defendants’ favor, and 
if the language of those opinions does not limit the holding to non-
capital crimes—that is, if it holds that the sentence of life without 
release as imposed on juveniles is unconstitutional, regardless of the 
crime of which they are convicted, then Martin would be impacted.  
Much the way Roper eliminated death as a punitive option and 
compelled legislative or judicial “re-sentencing” of each juvenile 
offender who had been sentenced to die prior to that holding, the 
 
sullivan.graham (last visited Apr. 18, 2010). 
 240. Graham v. State, 982 So. 2d 43, 45 (Fla. App. Dist. 2008). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Brief for the Petitioner at 20, Graham, 982 So. 2d 43 (No. 08-7412) (U.S. 
argued Nov. 9, 2009). 
 244. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Sullivan, 129 S. Ct. 2157 (No. 08-7621). 
31
Gordon: Case Note: It Doesn't Have to End This Way: The Minnesota Supreme
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
 
1302 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:3 
Supreme Court’s forthcoming decisions in Sullivan and Graham could 
mean that Martin and those similarly situated in both the federal and 
state criminal justice systems are constitutionally entitled to reevalua-
tion of their LWOR sentences, even if they serve time for homicide.   
The distinction between homicide and non-homicide crimes 
would be of considerably less importance if, in its anticipated Sullivan 
or Graham opinions, the Supreme Court resuscitates Roper’s founda-
tional premise, buoyed by thorough and compelling research, that 
juveniles are different by virtue of their brain development and thus 
inherently less culpable than adult offenders.  Additionally, the Court 
could also revive Roper’s “evolving standards of decency” gauge to 
assess the national consensus regarding the imposition of LWOR on 
juveniles.  If the Court were to make or accept findings that this 
consensus was that LWOR as imposed on juveniles is cruel, unusual, 
and lacking requisite deterrent effect, then the “standards,” having 
evolved, could lay the foundation for a declaration by the Court that 
LWOR as imposed on juveniles is unconstitutional.   
The Supreme Court’s definition of “juvenile,” if it provides one, 
could also mean different results for Martin and for Sullivan and 
Graham; perhaps a “sliding scale” for optimal age-offense correlation.  
Martin was seventeen at the time of the commission of his crime, 
whereas Sullivan was thirteen.  If “juvenile,” by definition, does not 
include offenders who committed their crimes six weeks before their 
eighteenth birthdays, then Martin might remain unaffected.  It will 
also be interesting to track if and how the Supreme Court addresses 
the trial judge in Graham’s case and his drastic upward departure—
from the recommended four years to the sentence of LWOR.  
Prohibitions of such actions, as well as admonishments to legislatures 
to reevaluate and restructure troubling auto-certification statutory 
glitches, could very well accompany any constitutional declarations. 
D. Navigating the Means, Ends, and Mean Endings: Formulating 
Recommendations for Juvenile Sentencing Reform 
The Martin opinion gave short shrift to constitutional issues, as 
did the dissent, but perhaps it is understandable why the Minnesota 
Supreme Court proceeded in this way.  Constitutional line-drawing, 
such as prohibition of the juvenile death penalty on Eighth Amend-
ment grounds,245 is difficult to do in an article such as this, let alone to 
do so in a way that affects real people on the ground, or, as it were, in 
 
 245. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573–74 (2005). 
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prison for life.  But it is not impossible and it is within the province of 
judges to draw these lines.  The U.S.  Supreme Court drew such a line 
in Roper by concluding that sentencing juveniles to the death penalty 
was unconstitutional.246  Even with the social, biological, and neuro-
logical research supporting the Court’s reasoned conclusion,247 it took 
great courage to assert the new constitutional mandate set out in that 
opinion. 
On the other hand, it makes some sense to avoid belaboring is-
sues that have been previously settled, especially in light of considera-
tions such as the value of finality and the preservation of 
constitutional integrity.  In Martin, the Minnesota Supreme Court was 
not persuaded by Roper’s logic and unwilling to divorce itself from 
principles of stare decisis,248 but it cannot be severely faulted for 
focusing on the important and somewhat unusual procedural aspects 
of Martin’s case and trial.  So, short of judicially-instigated, constitu-
tional line-drawing, what should be done about juvenile sentencing 
reform in general?  Risks inherent in answering these questions 
include arbitrariness and moralizing without any kind of reasoned 
foundation, but this discussion can and must continue while being 
mindful of such concerns.  The Minnesota Supreme Court could have 
brought the issue to the attention of the Minnesota Legislature (or 
Congress) by prefacing their remarks in this way.  Building upon that, 
the court could certainly call to the Legislature’s attention to the fact 
that Martin’s sentence—the harshest this state can impose—was the 
result of a disconcerting convergence of the automatic certification 
and automatic LWOR statutes.249  Doing so would not require any 
constitutional wrangling, and it is not something the court appears to 
want to avoid.250   
 
 246. Id. at 578–79. 
 247. See id. at 573–74. 
 248. State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 98 (Minn. 2009) (“[The court is] ‘extremely 
reluctant to overrule [its] precedent under principles of stare decisis’”) (quoting State 
v. Lee, 706 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn. 2005)). 
 249. See Minn. Stat. § 260B.007, subdiv. 6(b) (2008); Minn. Stat. § 260B.101, 
subdiv. 2 (2008); Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (2008). 
 250. On October 22, 2009, just two weeks after the Martin opinion was issued, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court decided State v. Peck, “the bong water case.”  773 N.W.2d 
768, 773 (Minn. 2009) (holding that bong water that tested positive for methamphe-
tamine was a “mixture” for purposes of charge alleging possession).  In his dissent, 
Justice Paul Anderson notes that the Minnesota Legislature “attempted” to assess the 
risks in punishing non-violent drug offenders when it enacted chapter 152, which 
differentiates between less serious and more serious drug offenders by the weight of 
the controlled substance at issue in that case.  Id. at 782 (Anderson, J., dissenting).  
The law, Justice Anderson conceded, was applied correctly by the district court and 
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Recent coverage of juvenile LWOR sentencing by major media 
outlets demonstrates that the issue is moving to the fore of the 
nation’s consciousness.251  This suggests that standards of decency are 
evolving, or at least being reconsidered.  The aforementioned cases 
pending at the Supreme Court are examples of this trend, and there 
have been several attempts by members of Congress within the last 
few sessions to revisit the issue of juvenile LWOR and reform thereof.  
This legislation, if enacted, would encourage states to modify and 
soften their juvenile justice policies in exchange for federal aid.252  
Proposals such as these anticipate indeterminacy in sentencing on the 
front end of the process (i.e., at sentencing following trial and 
conviction, but before protracted incarceration).  They do not bar the 
imposition of the sentence of LWOR on juveniles; rather, they allow 
for broader and more significant protections for young people 
convicted of serious crimes.   
But in jurisdictions where automatic certification statutes con-
 
the court of appeals, but he criticizes the Peck majority for ultimately affirming the 
prosecuting county’s constitutionally-questionable interpretation of the state law, and 
taking it in “an improper and counterproductive direction.”  Id.  While his frustration 
with the majority on this point is obvious, it is also a call to the Minnesota Legislature 
to reassess the risks of “punishing non-violent drug offenders who are presently 
swelling our prison populations beyond capacity.”  Id.  It is likely that Justice 
Anderson’s solution to this problem included a reworking of legislative text to insure 
a fairer and more public policy-minded result.  Likewise, either the majority or dissent 
in Martin could have noted the statutory convergence, the automatic, non-reviewable 
LWOR sentence that resulted, and the value of such a revision process in his case and 
others like it. 
 251. E.g., Editorial, De-Criminalizing Children, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2009, at A46; 
Supreme Court Weighs Life Sentences for Juveniles (National Public Radio broadcast Nov. 
9, 2009).  
 252. For example, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont introduced a bill to 
reauthorize the Juvenile Justice Delinquency and Prevention Act of 1974, which 
included modifications such as disallowing contact between juvenile and adult 
offenders (if the two age groups were housed at the same correctional facility), and 
later, in an amended version of the Act, limiting even further the circumstances 
under which juveniles could be ordered to serve their sentences in adult prisons in 
the first place.  See S. 3155, 110th Cong., 2d Sess. (as reported by S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, July 31, 2008); Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 
P.L. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1109 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 5601 et seq. (2002)).  
Similarly, Congressman Robert Scott of Virginia, in May 2009, introduced the 
Juvenile Justice Accountability and Improvement Act of 2009, which grants juvenile 
offenders serving life sentences opportunities for parole or supervised release “not 
less than once during their first 15 years of incarceration, and not less than once 
every 3 years thereafter . . . .”  This bill also awards grants to states to improve legal 
representation for child defendants charged with an offense carrying a possible 
sentence of life in prison.  H.R. 2289, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009).  Neither of these 
bills ever made it out of subcommittee hearings. 
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verge with statutes linking a sentence of LWOR to crimes deemed 
severe enough, Congress (or state legislatures, at their discretion) 
should consider enacting an “override” function on the front end of 
the process, mandating that juveniles sentenced to LWOR under 
these circumstances be granted regular reviews on a case-by-case basis.  
These reviews should be completed early on, especially at the 
certification stage and at the sentencing stages, to ensure that sound 
reasoning and consideration of all relevant factors—and not hapha-
zard moralizing and statutory constructs—underlie the sentencing 
orders imposed on juveniles in Minnesota. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Roper stands for the fundamental proposition that children are 
different.253  Bolstered by comprehensive social science research, the 
U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that sentencing juveniles to the death 
penalty was unconstitutional.254  It is cruel.  It is unusual.  It sends the 
message to our youth that society does not believe in their rehabilita-
tion.  Similarly, a sentence of life without release is mercilessly 
skeptical of a child’s potential for growth and redemption.   
A timely comment by a Hennepin County trial court judge sums 
it up nicely: “Life with the possibility of parole does not mandate 
release. It does give a future generation the opportunity to reflect, 
[and to] exercise compassion if appropriate.”255 
Because Minnesota’s automatic certification statutes deny juve-
niles any hearing whatsoever, these statutes deny juveniles due 
process, and subject them to unduly harsh punishments in adult 
court.  In light of these cases and the legal concepts they explain, 
Minnesota’s highest court should have declared the automatic 
treatment unconstitutional.  The court missed an opportunity to do so 




 253. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 254. Id. at 578–79. 
 255. Posting of Hon. Kevin Burke to Sentencing Law and Policy, 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2009/10/minnesota-
supreme-court-rejects-constitutional-arguments-against-lwop-sentence-for-17yearold-
murdere.html (Oct. 15, 2009, 10:13:20). 
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